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Abstract:  From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, 
Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost 
sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss 
the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian 
pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in 
teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience. 
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Woodruff (2017) presents two main propositions in his article: (1) teleost fish are sentient, and 
(2) this sentience (what it "feels like" to be a fish) has sufficient neuroanatomical support via 
tecto-pallial interconnections. The first claim might strike some as audacious. Whereas Woodruff 
does not have me fully convinced, he does provide interesting lines of evidence that might shed 
some light on the question. His second proposition is one that I fully support; my commentary 
comes from my perspective as a comparative neuroanatomist (largely working in birds) whose 
larger research interests include brain evolution in vertebrates.  
 
1. The Hard (and Messy) Problem of Animal Consciousness. Woodruff uses the term “sentience” 
to convey the same meaning as “sensory consciousness” (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Mallatt & 
Feinberg, 2016) or “primary consciousness” (Edelman, 1989). A key aspect of the consciousness 
debate is one’s position on consciousness as either qualitative or quantitative among organisms. 
If one adopts the former (either you have “it” or you don’t) as the null hypothesis, then sufficient 
evidence would be exceedingly difficult to accrue to satisfy the skeptic. If one takes the 
quantitative position (consciousness is a matter of degree), then the kinds of evidence we can 
bring to bear broadens. To this end, Woodruff does an excellent job. Sufficiently well-controlled 
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experiments could (in principle) yield data allowing the observed behaviors to be more 
parsimoniously ascribed to some form or another of consciousness. 
Using Block’s (1995) two aspects of consciousness, phenomenal (p) consciousness aligns 
best with Woodruff’s “sentience.” The raw material for p-consciousness is qualia — what it “feels 
like” to smell a rose, have a song stuck in your head, or experience pain. The sensory richness of 
this raw material in creating Uexküll’s “self-centered” world or Umvelt (Sutrop, 2001) can be as 
great as, or greater, than that of humans. It can even incorporate senses for which we have no 
frame of reference (e.g., electroreception). There should be no apriori assumption that the p-
consciousness of other animals (if it exists) is impoverished in any fundamental way. Woodruff 
addresses this indirectly in his discussion concerning retinotopic mapping onto the optic tectum 
(“sensory isomorphism”; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016) and the existence of both modality-specific 
and more “associative” areas of the fish pallium. Block’s (1995) access (a) consciousness is (in part) 
where focused attention brings some subset of qualia to the forefront for some purpose (e.g., for 
the control of action). Experiments on selective attention in fish, which can vary the “force and 
focus of sentience” (as Woodruff elegantly puts it), indicate that teleosts possess both parallel 
modes (associated with “pop-out” phenomena) and serial search modes (where increasing 
distractors increase search time). In addition, these modes have corresponding neural correlates 
in the fish tectum. This is reminiscent of Crick’s (1995) emphasis on aspects of visual attention 
and the “binding problem” as one of the few experimentally tractable approaches to the study of 
consciousness. The boundary of p- versus a-consciousness can certainly be fuzzy. It seems to me 
that the type of evidence Woodruff provides speaks more to a-consciousness than sentience per 
se. He is on stronger ground when addressing the notion of whether consciousness can be 
supported by brains without the cortical layering characteristic of the mammalian brain. 
 
2. Animals Without Cortex Need Not Apply? I am in complete agreement with Woodruff’s second 
proposition that the neural substrates necessary to support something as grand as consciousness 
(however defined) do not require a cerebral cortex. The intellectual roots of this bias are deep, 
informed by an ingrained scala naturae view of animal intelligence — a linear arrangement from 
fish to mammals with, of course, humans at its pinnacle (Buffon, 1749). The pioneering early 20th 
century neuroanatomists (limited by techniques of the time) were arguably still influenced by this 
view as they attempted to understand brain evolution in non-mammalian species (Ariëns-
Kappers, 1922; Huber & Crosby, 1929; Johnston, 1923). These anatomists viewed brain evolution 
as an accumulation of layers whereby “higher functions” migrated from mesencephalic substrates 
(e.g., tectum) to the telencephalon. In birds, this led to the assertion that the avian forebrain was 
dominated by basal ganglia and was hence limited primarily to instinct rather than cognitive 
flexibility (Edinger, 1908; Herrick, 1956). This was reflected in terminology applying the suffix “-
striatum” to many avian forebrain areas. Later, more advanced techniques demonstrated that the 
majority of the avian forebrain is pallial, with areas homologous or functionally analogous to 
features of the mammalian neocortex (Reiner et al., 2004; The Avian Brain Nomenclature 
Consortium, 2005). 
The aforementioned scala naturae view of brain evolution still has influence. The 
argument that a neocortex is essential for as grand a function as consciousness is not self-evident 
(although many seem to think so). Definitive studies establishing the minimal architecture 
necessary for complex cognition (substantiated in either brains or microprocessors) do not yet 
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exist. Evidence for the cognitive sophistication of birds (in both the field and laboratory) has been 
steadily accumulating (Emery & Clayton, 2004; Taylor, 2014; Weir, 2002) and these abilities are 
supported by a decidedly non-cortical pallium (Karten, 2015). Consciousness need not be 
homologous among organisms that (potentially) possess it, and bound to the cortical architecture 
exclusive to mammals. Perhaps several evolutionary trajectories have arrived at brains with some 
degree of sentience. 
 
3. Conclusions on Teleost Sentience. To his credit, Woodruff brings a diverse set of anatomical, 
physiological, and behavioral lines of evidence to bear on the question of teleost sentience. I will 
leave the heavy intellectual lifting to the philosophers on what constitutes consciousness, and to 
the ethicists about what sentience means for where the “lines” are ultimately drawn in terms of 
the moral standing of other organisms. I will be interested to see further anatomical and 
behavioral work on the teleost pallium that could shed more light on the question of whether 
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On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and 
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will 
host a conference on Animal Consciousness. 
 
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss 
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are non-
human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does 
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What 
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness 




Speakers and panelists include: 
  
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of 
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),  
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, 
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, 
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),  
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, 
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary 
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel 
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, 
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy) 
 
 
Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. 
 
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 
8th St).  
 
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness 
and ethics”.  
 
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel 
discussion.  
 
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 
 
Registration is free but required.  
 
Register here.  
 
See also the conference website. 
 
 
 
 
 
